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  Abstract 
This paper studies the quantitative impact of aging on the financing of social security and the 
public sector in Switzerland. Demographic projections forecast a doubling of the dependency 
ratio until 2050 as well as an increase of 10% in total population due to longer life 
expectancy. We use a computational growth model with overlapping generations, including 
labor market adjustment on five different behavioural margins: labor market participation, 
hours worked, job search, retirement, and on-the-job training. Starting with a passive fiscal 
strategy, our simulations show that a doubling of the old age dependency ratio might reduce 
per capita income by more than 20 percent and necessitate a long-run increase of wage 
taxes and social security contributions by 21 percentage points. A comprehensive reform 
package, including an increase in the effective retirement age to 68 years and several other 
measures, may limit the increase of the tax burden to 4 percentage points of the value added 
tax and reduce the decline of per capita income to 6% in the long-run. firms typically have a 
high growth potential, need external funds to finance investment, and rely on the key effort 
and know-how of inside entrepreneurs. Given the limited amount of tangible assets and the 
non-contractible nature of entrepreneurial effort, these firms are often financially 
constrained. Access to external funds becomes an important factor in the expansion of 
innovative industries. This paper models a two sector economy of innovative and standard 
industries and shows how the pattern of comparative advantage is shaped by factor 
endowments and variables relating to corporate finance. In particular, a larger equity ratio of 
young entrepreneurial firms and tough corporate governance standards relax the financing 
constraints and create a comparative advantage in innovative industries.  
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Aging, social security, retirement, human capital, unemployment.  
JEL Classification 
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 1 Introduction
Demographic change poses a big challenge to the welfare state. The impact of aging on the
economy primarily results from the need to adjust the social insurance system in the face of a
rising old-age dependency ratio. Keeping old-age insurance sustainable is the largest challenge.
With current levels of pension beneﬁts and a much larger number of retirees, spending and
contribution rates will need to grow to unprecedented levels. Already now, social spending is
a main driver of public sector growth in Switzerland. The size of the public sector increased
from 26.2% of GDP in 1990 to 30.2% in 2007. The prime reason is spending on social insurance
which grew from 7.2% to 10.8% of GDP (see Bundesrat, 2008). Given the projected rise in
the old age dependency ratio, this trend is bound to accelerate over several decades if current
policies are continued unreformed. In consequence, the burden of labor taxes and social security
contributions would have to grow much larger, with obviously negative consequences for labor
market performance. Since contributions to social insurance are basically proportional, they
impose a substantial tax/contribution burden in the low and medium income tax brackets even
if the income tax burden is low.
The ﬁnancing of social insurance and labor market behavior are importantly interrelated.
Aging necessitates higher contributions to ﬁnance constant replacement rates for beneﬁt levels
which negatively aﬀect labor earnings and growth. Lower earnings, in turn, require a further
increase in contribution rates and labor taxes. The present paper focusses on induced incentive
eﬀects of social security on several important margins of labor market behavior in general equi-
librium. Speciﬁcally, we consider ﬁve diﬀerent behavioral margins: (i) Employees can adjust
intensive labor supply, consisting of hours worked or eﬀort on the job. This incentive is mea-
sured by the eﬀective tax rate on wage income which includes not only the income tax but also
contributions to social security as well as consumption taxes. Only part of social security con-
tributions must be considered as an eﬀective tax, the remaining part is an actuarially fair price
for individual insurance. The eﬀective tax component adds to the general wage tax burden.
If the pension system includes an operative tax beneﬁt link, earning more today raises one’s
own beneﬁts during retirement. Typically, the present value of these extra beneﬁts is worth
less than current contribution payments. The remaining part of the statutory contribution rate
is an eﬀective (implicit) tax, as was ﬁrst pointed out by Feldstein and Samwick (1992). Many
1economic studies conﬁne themselves to this intensive margin of labor supply.
However, the size and quality of aggregate employment importantly depend on other margins
of labor market behavior which also adjust to an increasing labor tax burden. (ii) Employees
may invest in education and life-time training and, thereby, enhance their future skills and
productivity on the job. Being an investment in human capital, training means to accept lower
income today to raise future earnings. A progressive income tax tends to discourage training
since the extra tax on higher future earnings is larger than the tax savings today when the
individual gives up income to devote more time to training. On the other hand, the government
often directly subsidizes current training costs. Training incentives are also importantly linked
to policies for an aging society. Encouraging postponed retirement not only raises labor force
participation among older workers, but also strengthens incentives for training among prime age
workers as they can expect to consume the returns to training over a longer active working life.
These continuous margins are complemented by several discrete labor market decisions. (iii)
Taxes and beneﬁts inﬂuence individual decisions to enter the labor market and, thereby, aﬀect
participation rates among prime age workers. The larger the net of tax labor income from
active employment is relative to the generosity of social assistance, the larger is the incentive to
(re-)enter the labor market. Fiscal incentives are captured by so-called ‘participation tax rates’
which are typically large since they consist of the sum of tax and contribution rates and the
replacement rate of social income when out of the labor force. (iv) The incentives of unemployed
persons in the labor force to search for employment and accept a job opportunity are reduced
by wage taxes and contribution payments as well as by the foregone beneﬁts and assistance
payments when leaving unemployment. (v) Finally, an individual’s actual retirement date to a
large part reﬂects a participation decision as well. When postponing retirement and continuing
work, a person pays taxes and social security contributions over a longer period and, at the same
time, may have to give up an eligible pension. The participation tax rate on continued work can
be very high since it consists of the sum of the total eﬀective tax burden plus the foregone pension
beneﬁt, and could be an important reason to retire early. The incentives for early retirement
can be much reduced if the pension system includes signiﬁcant pension discounts/supplements
to punish/reward individuals for retiring earlier/later.
This paper aims to quantify the potential economic impact of aging in Switzerland. To this
2end, we use a dynamic general equilibrium model with a particularly detailed modeling of labor
market adjustment along ﬁve behavioral margins. The model replicates the demographic pro-
jections for Switzerland, including a doubling of the old-age dependency ratio over the next ﬁfty
years due to increased life-expectancy, and captures the ﬁscal implications of this development.
It follows the transition from current initial conditions to a long-run balanced growth equilib-
rium with a new stationary population structure. Demographic change enters as an exogenous
shock to the economy which requires a large adjustment of public sector institutions and trig-
gers equally large changes in labor market equilibrium and economic growth. In particular, the
model captures the intricate interactions between diﬀerent dimensions of aggregate labor supply,
including labor market participation, job search, hours worked, training, and retirement. As a
base case scenario, we ﬁrst simulate the consequences of a passive ﬁscal strategy which merely
adjust labor taxes and contribution rates to keep public budgets balanced. In line with existing
literature, the consequences for total labor taxes and per capita income turn out rather discour-
aging. We then turn to a comprehensive reform proposal which implements six important policy
measures, ranging from structural reform of the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pillar to an increase in
statutory retirement age. Raising retirement age by eﬀectively four years is by far the most im-
portant measure. The simulation results show that the reform can limit the increase of the tax
burden to 4% of the value added tax (VAT) rate and the decline in per capita income to 6% in
long-run. The key message of the paper is, thus, that a large part of the negative consequences
of aging can be oﬀset by a comprehensive reform package to boost the quantity and quality of
aggregate labor supply and, thereby, the contribution base of social security.
An important point of our analysis is that the projections of the demographic dependency
ratio (ratio of population older than 65 relative to working age population) should be comple-
mented by an analysis of the economic dependency ratio (size of retired or passive population
relative to active population). The diﬀerence is in the adjustment of the retirement age. A
particular problem is the general tendency towards early retirement. The decline in labor force
participation is partly due to the speciﬁc characteristics of current pension systems which, in
many countries, imposes considerable negative accrual rates of pension wealth and discourages
continued work. Retirement behavior was extensively analyzed in the theoretical and empirical
literature, e.g. in Gruber and Wise (1999) who summarize results for a wide range of industrial
3countries. Falta et al. (2003) and Balthasar et al. (2003) discuss the situation in Switzerland.
The demographic eﬀects on the ﬁnancing of pensions and on the economy are discussed in
Miles (1999), Börsch-Supan and Winter (2001), and Bovenberg and Knaap (2005), for example.1
Weil (2006) argues that the most important demographic eﬀects on the economy occur via the
ﬁnancing of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions. Recently, the debate in the U.S. has focussed
on either assigning a more important role to capital funded systems (Kotlikoﬀ, 1997, Feldstein,
2005a,b, Feldstein and Samwick, 2002) or reforming the existing PAYG systems (Diamond, 2004,
Diamond and Orszag, 2005). Jaag et al. (2009), Grafenhofer et al. (2007) and Keuschnigg
and Keuschnigg (2004) analyze aging and pension reform in Austria. Lieb et al. (2003) and
Abrahamsen and Hartwig (2003) study the expected demographic eﬀects on old-age insurance
in Switzerland. We claim that our model and analysis is the most complete and innovative in
assessing the potential labor market consequences of aging and social security reform.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the demographic projections for Switzer-
land and oﬀers a ﬁrst analytical assessment of the consequences of aging. Section 3 reviews
the empirical evidence on labor market reactions. Section 4 shortly familiarizes the reader with
the key features and parameterization of the numerical model, deﬁnes a comprehensive policy
approach, and then discusses the quantitative results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Aging and Public Finances
2.1 Demographic Change
The demographic scenario published by the Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce projects population
growth from 7.2m in 2005 to 8.1m in 2050. This increase is not due to immigration or higher
fertility but rather to longer life-times. Lower mortality rates and higher life-expectancy result
in a larger proportion of old people. The dependency ratio, measuring the ratio of people older
than 65 and the population of 20 to 64 years old, must inevitably rise. The share of over 65
years old is expected to reach 28% of the total population, compared to 16% in 2005. Hence,
the dependency ratio will almost double until 2050 (see Figure 1).
1Important survey articles include Feldstein and Liebman (2002), Bovenberg (2003), Lindbeck and Perrson
(2003), and Fenge and Pestieau (2005).
4Demographic change is governed by three important factors: mortality and life-expectancy,
fertility, and migration. There are three oﬃcial scenarios with respect to life-expectancy in
Switzerland (see BFS, 2006). An intermediate scenario assumes that better prevention and
continuous medical advancements raise life-expectancy at birth to 85.0 years for men and 89.5
years for women in 2050, compared to 78.6 and 83.7 years, respectively, in 2005. The average
fertility was 1.4 children per woman in 2005. The intermediate scenario assumes that increased
public awareness of the families’ economic and social importance leads to increased support. As
a result, the currently low fertility is expected to rise somewhat. Finally, the average scenario
assumes that the current trends in net migration will be extended into the future. The free
movement of persons will yield only transitory eﬀects on the net immigration from new EU
member states. According to the scenario, net immigration which was roughly 40’000 persons
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Figure 1: Old Age Dependency Ratio
Our overlapping generations model approximates these trends. A restriction in using a
model of balanced growth is that simulations must assume the economy to start from an initial
stationary state. Neither the economy nor the population structure is in a steady state at any
point in time so that data must be averaged over time and adjusted to some degree to reconcile
them with the requirements of a balanced growth equilibrium. However, the key macroeconomic
and demographic indicators, such as the current dependency ratio, are correctly implemented
5in the model. According to demographic forecasts, the old-age dependency ratio will double in
the long-run and eventually reach a ratio of roughly 0.5. As Figure 2 shows, the survival rates
increase already in earlier stages of the life-cycle. A 60 year old person will reach more probably
the age of 70, a 70 year old is more likely to live until the age of 80, etc. The aging scenario in
our model is based on the simplifying assumption that the maximum life-duration is 100 years
and does not change so that the survival rate of the last group stays constant. However, lower
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Figure 2: Survival Probabilities
For a given inﬂow of new borns, lower mortality rates change both the structure and the size
of the population. Keeping the inﬂow of newborns constant, the size of the older population
grows when mortality declines. Figure 3 shows how, in turn, the share of older age groups in the
total population rises while the share of younger cohorts shrinks. The bars illustrate the relative
weights of diﬀerent age-groups. It is important to note that the long-run age composition of the
population is determined exclusively by survival and mortality rates. A larger permanent inﬂow
of new generations, brought about by a higher fertility rate or as a result of immigration, cannot
change the demographic structure in the long-run but can only scale up the total population
size. The inﬂow in the model is set such that population size grows by 10% in the long-run,
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Figure 3: Population Structure
2.2 A Simple Estimate
To illustrate the economic and ﬁscal consequences of aging in a simple and transparent manner,
we collapse the simulation model into two life-cycle stages. The total population over 20 divides
into NA active workers (20 to 65 years old) and NR retirees (over 65 years old), N = NA+NR.
To roughly replicate the current situation in Switzerland, we assume a dependency ratio of
ρ = NR/NA = .25 and set total population size at N = 8m. These assumptions imply a
population structure as in (1) below, consisting of NA = 6.4m active workers NR = 1.6m
retired persons. Hence, 80% (NA/N = .8) of the population are active and 20% are retired,
implying a dependency ratio of 25%.
NA = 1








The second column of (1) translates the cross-section into a life-cycle dimension where TL
denotes total years of life-time and TA and TR the duration of active and retired life. If 80%
of the total population are active, then 80% of total life-span is spent in the active phase.
7Retirement, on average, lasts TR years. The ratio of retired to active working life is equal to
the dependency ratio, TR/TA = ρ. If the working phase starts at 20 and retirement at 65, the
active phase lasts TA = 45 years. From (1), total life-span amounts to TL = (1 + ρ)TA on
average which is 1.25 × 45 = 56.25 years and corresponds to a life-span of about 76 years, with
TR = 11.25 years spent in retirement. These numbers roughly capture the current demographic
characteristics in Switzerland.
A steady state involves a continuous demographic change. Young generations turn old while
old generations die and are replaced by new young people. This turnover process can be described
by two parameters. A fraction γ of old people dies and is replaced by n = γNR newborns so that
inﬂow and outﬂow are equal. The parameter γ is the mortality rate among the old or, from an
individual perspective, the instantaneous probability of dying. For simplicity, we abstract from
mortality at young ages. Similarly, a parameter ω describes the rate with which people turn old
and, thus, switch from the young to the old age state. A constant population structure requires
that each subgroup remains constant as well. Hence, inﬂows must equal outﬂows in each group,
n = ωNA for the young and ωNA = γNR for the old. The aging and mortality rates are equal
to the reciprocal values of the average duration in each state. If a new generation spends TA
years in the active phase, and a new retiree expects to live for TR more years, then
ω = 1/TA, γ = 1/TR. (2)
In our example, the transition rates are ω = 1/45 ≈ .022 and γ = 1/11.25 ≈ .089. With this
information, we are able to compute the number of deceases and newborns: n = ωNA = γNR ≈
.1422m per year, which amounts to 1.78% of the total population (8m). Using n/ω = NA
and n/γ = NR, the inﬂow of newborns yields a stationary population of N = NA + NR =
(1/ω + 1/γ)n. Having calibrated the demographic parameters from stationary population data,
we ﬁnd the dependency ratio to reﬂect the ratio of duration rates in old and young life-cycle
stages, ρ = TR/TA = .25, while total population size is linked to total life-time, N = nTL = 8.
These numbers are consistent with the data stated above.
The main ﬁscal consequences of aging stem from old age insurance. Denoting the per capita
earnings of the young by y and the per capita pension of the old by p, the budget constraint of
8a PAYG pension system is





NA = ρP   ρ. (3)
The pension replacement rate (for all pillars together) varies around a value of ρP = p/y = .6,
i.e. retirement income amounts to around 60% of wage earnings. Given a dependency ratio of
ρ = .25, the contribution rate must be roughly 15% (t = .6 × .25 = .15) which is a realistic
value. The rest of the public sector is ignored here, but is, of course, represented in detail in
the simulation model. Finally, per capita income depends on the population structure. Labor
productivity of active workers is y, yielding a GDP level of yNA. Dividing by total population
yields, on account of (1), average per capita income of
  y = yNA/N = y/(1 + ρ). (4)
Fertility: With this simple model at hand, one can calculate in a straightforward manner
the consequences of important demographic scenarios. Declining fertility is often considered an
important reason for an increasing dependency ratio. In the long-run, this is not true. Only the
size of the population is aﬀected, but not its structure. If life-expectancy and duration of the
active working period remain unchanged, meaning that the aging and mortality rates ω and γ
are unaﬀected, the dependency ratio ρ = TR/TA = ω/γ remains constant. Because the size of
the population is linked to the size of the inﬂow n by N = n   TL, a permanent decline in the
number of newborns by 10% scales down total population and the size of each age group by the
same percentage, without changing the dependency ratio and the required pension contribution
rates in (3). However, increasing fertility aﬀects the population structure in the short-run where
the mass of active population increases before the mass of retired people starts to grow, i.e.
before the ‘baby boom’ generation retires. In the same vein, immigration which might partly
oﬀset declining fertility of the native population, augments the active workforce faster than the
retired population, and therefore leads to a temporary reduction in the dependency ratio. In
contrast, declining fertility leads to a temporary increase in the dependency ratio.
Life-Expectancy: By 2050, life-expectancy in Switzerland will have increased by about 6
years. Progress in medical care reduces mortality almost exclusively among the old because
9mortality for the young is close to zero anyway. Hence, the size of young cohorts and the
number of women in child-bearing age remain unchanged. With fertility unchanged, the number
of newborns is ﬁxed, and the parameters n, NA and TA = 1/ω remain constant. The increase
in overall lifetime by 6 years lengthens the duration of retirement from 11.25 to TR = 17.25
years, resulting in population growth at the ‘old end’ and raising the dependency ratio from 25%
to more than 38% (ρ = TR/TA = .3833). Total lifetime after 20 is prolonged to TL = 62.25
and implies a life-expectancy of 82.25 years. The total population increases by 10.6% from 8 to
8.85m (N = nTL = .1422 × 62.25). This increase is determined only by the growth of the old
population group from 1.6 to 2.45m (NR = ρNA = .3833 × 6.4). The Swiss Federal Statistical
Oﬃce estimates a population increase from 7.2m today to 8.1m in 2050, which is an increase
by .8m, similar to our example. Therefore, projected population growth mainly reﬂects higher
life-expectancy while the decline in fertility is roughly oﬀset by immigration.
This demographic change has at least three important economic consequences. First, popula-
tion growth due to increased life-expectance strongly reduces per capita income. Given constant
labor productivity y of the young, the level of GDP equal to yNA is not aﬀected. However,
when the dependency ratio rising from 25 to 38% as noted above, average per capita GDP in (4)
declines by 100 × (1.25/1.38 − 1)%, or roughly 9.5%. The eﬀect is certainly large and further
magniﬁed if a rising tax burden erodes earnings of the young. Second, the rising dependency
ratio makes the pension scheme unsustainable in its current form. According to (3), the con-
tribution rate would have to be raised from 15% at present to 23% (t = .6 × .3833), i.e. by 8
percentage points, if the replacement rate is not adjusted. The ﬁscal consequences are proba-
bly further aggravated by rising pressure for other age related public spending such as health
care. Third, an increase in the tax burden of this scale or a reduction in replacement rates will
certainly trigger behavioral responses with important consequences for aggregate labor supply,
labor productivity and per capita income. To quantify the labor market eﬀects of aging is, of
course, the prime purpose of the subsequent general equilibrium simulations.
Retirement Age: A much debated strategy to mitigate the ﬁscal eﬀects of longevity is to
raise the eﬀective retirement age. By how much would retirement have to be postponed, so
that the dependency ratio remains unchanged? Today, a person spends about 80% (TA/TL)
of her adult life in the active workforce and 20% in retirement. If the average life-span is
10extended by 6 years to over 82 years (i.e. to TL = 62.25 years of adult life), the dependency
ratio can stay constant at ρ = .25 only if the duration of working life rises from 45 to 49.8
years (TA = TL/(1 + ρ) = 62.25/1.25, see 1) and retirement is postponed to the age of 69.8
instead of 65 years. When life-expectancy rises by 6 years, a constant ‘economic dependency
ratio’ requires that people spend only 6/(1 + ρ) or 1.2 additional years in retirement while the
active phase is prolonged by 6 × ρ/(1 + ρ) or 4.8 years. Hence, retirement must be postponed
from age 65 to 69.8 if the economic dependency ratio is to remain constant. In other words,
every year of life extension must be split between work and retirement in the same way as
is done prior to the increase in longevity. Today, a person works for about 4/5 of her total
adult life and spends 1/5 in retirement. If life-expectancy rises by one year, households should
thus work 9.6 months longer (12 × 4/5) and aﬀord 2.4 months of additional retirement time.
With ρ constant, the pension budget in (3) remains balanced without any need to adjust either
contribution or pension replacement rates, and average per capita income in (4) is untarnished.
If the increase in retirement age is less ambitious, the ‘economic dependency ratio’ will rise which
inevitably forces measures to rebalance the social security system and erodes average per capita
income. Obviously, these stylized calculations are only a gross approximation but should suﬃce
to illustrate some key eﬀects and the principal magnitudes involved.
3 Incentive Eﬀects of Social Security
The labor market eﬀects of reforming social security depend on the tax character of contributions.
PAYG contributions have a tax component which adds to negative incentive eﬀects of labor
taxes. If pension size at the margin is not at all linked to one’s own contributions, as is the case
in Switzerland with minimum or maximum pensions, the tax component is 100%. The more
incomplete the tax beneﬁt link is, the larger is the tax component. Further, PAYG contributions
tend to be higher since they are not invested in the capital market and do not earn interest. The
implicit return of the PAYG system equals the growth rate of the contribution base and is lower
than the long-run interest rate. Households are forced to save for retirement by contributing to
the PAYG system which oﬀers a lower return than is possible on the capital market. The tax
component of contributions reﬂects the foregone income due to a lower rate of return. Pensions
in a funded system, in contrast, are fully linked to contributions, including (compound) interest.
11Contributions thus reﬂect an actuarially fair price for later beneﬁts and have (almost) no tax
component.2 The funded pillar thus distorts labor supply less than the PAYG pillar. We now
review the empirical evidence on ﬁve diﬀerent margins of labor supply over the life-cycle.
Hours Worked: The classical channel for labor supply is on the intensive margin. People
respond by adjusting hours worked, or intensity of work eﬀort on the job. They work more
if the current real wage net of taxes is high and if current earnings create additional beneﬁts
such as higher unemployment beneﬁts, or higher future pensions in an earnings linked system.
The overall eﬀective tax burden on work eﬀort includes the wage tax, indirect taxes, and the
implicit tax component of social security contributions. Feldstein and Samwick (1992) deﬁned
the concept of the implicit tax rate which summarizes the incentive eﬀects of the pension system
on intensive labor supply, and have calculated these tax rates for the U.S. As mentioned above, a
strong tax-beneﬁt-link reduces the tax component of contributions and strengthens labor market
incentives. The econometric estimates of Disney (2004) show that men are not very responsive
to a change in the eﬀective contribution tax while women’s activity rates are strongly aﬀected.
These ﬁndings are consistent with much of the empirical labor supply literature. Blundell and
MaCurdy (1999) and Meghir and Phillips (2008) survey the large literature.
Job Search: Aggregate labor supply importantly depends on the incentives to search for jobs
and actually accept an employment opportunity. Job search of workers and job creation by
ﬁrms determine market tightness and equilibrium unemployment in a frictional labor market.
Job search is driven by the diﬀerence in disposable incomes a worker can obtain in states of
employment and unemployment. Search incentives thus depend on the expected net wage, the
design of the unemployment insurance and pension systems and the value individuals attach to
leisure (unemployment). The eﬀective tax on job search tends to be large because it consists
of the sum of wage and implicit contribution taxes plus foregone unemployment beneﬁts. The
pension system reduces search incentives via the implicit contribution tax. The stronger the
tax-beneﬁt-link, the lower is the implicit tax, and the stronger are incentives for job search.
2Given the higher risk of a funded system due to capital market ﬂuctuations, diversiﬁcation calls for a mixed
multipillar system even if PAYG contributions oﬀer a lower return and are partly a tax.
12There is a large empirical literature on the inﬂuence of unemployment insurance on reserva-
tion wages and job-search intensity, see the reviews by Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) and
Krueger and Meyer (2002). For example, Feldstein and Poterba (1984) ﬁnd a positive correla-
tion between the size of unemployment beneﬁts and observed reservation wage: a 10% increase
in unemployment beneﬁts induces a 4% increase in the reservation wage. Clark and Summers
(1982) show that a 10% beneﬁt reduction reduces the U.S. unemployment rate from 6% to 5.92%.
This result implies an elasticity of the unemployment rate with respect to unemployment ben-
eﬁts of .13. According to a study by Belot and van Ours (2001) for 18 OECD countries, a one
percent increase in the replacement ratio results in a .7 percent increase in the unemployment
rate. They also estimate that a one percentage point increase in the income tax rate shrinks the
unemployment rate by .12 percentage points.
Labor Market Participation: People decide whether to participate in the labor market and
to start active job search at all. Immervoll et al. (2007) summarize the recent literature. Eissa
and Hoynes (2004) point out that participation elasticities diﬀer substantially across diﬀerent
population groups. Low skilled households react strongly to participation incentives, and women
have a much higher elasticity than men. Even though marginal tax rates are low for the bottom
income classes, eﬀective taxes on labor market participation may be large and have strong eﬀects
since agents give up substantial replacement income when entering the workforce. In contrast,
skilled people with high wage expectations respond only weakly to participation incentives (see
Blundell, 1995).
Retirement Decision: The most important distortion of the pension system probably relates
to retirement behavior. To encourage continued work beyond the statutory retirement age, the
PAYG system may reward postponed retirement with pension supplements and apply discounts
to punish early retirement. When these supplements/discounts are low, the eﬀective tax on
continued work is high and leads people to retire earlier. A capital funded system sets pension
supplements in an actuarially fair way so that the present value of future pensions over the
remaining retirement period just corresponds to accumulated pension capital at the retirement
date. The eﬀective tax is then close to zero which largely avoids a distortion of retirement choice.
In Switzerland, pension supplements and discounts are probably close to an actuarily fair level
13also in the PAYG system. A key decision is, however, what the statutory retirement age should
be when the normal beneﬁt level is granted.
The design of the pension system determines the old age participation tax (eﬀective tax on
continued work). The participation tax measures the total ﬁscal burden on employees, as a
share of last earnings from active employment, when they postpone retirement by another year.
This measure has three components: (i) wage taxes and contributions paid for another year
of continued work; plus (ii) foregone pension beneﬁts that would have been received in case of
immediate retirement; minus (iii) the present value of pension supplements acquired per year
of postponed retirement. A high participation tax rate makes continued work less attractive
and encourages workers to retire earlier.3 The tax is strongly reduced by an actuarially fair
adjustment of beneﬁts. The pension supplements are meant to compensate for the additional
taxes and contributions, as well as for the savings due to foregone pensions. The Gruber and
Wise (1999, 2004, 2007) worldwide project and subsequent updates provide a documentation of
participation tax rates and their impact on retirement behavior. Börsch-Supan (2000) estimates
that a decrease in beneﬁts by 12% would reduce the retirement probability of the 60 years old
from 39.3 to 28.1%, implying a semi-elasticity of retirement equal to .93. However, this value
falls with age and is estimated at .45 for 64 year-olds.
Life-Time Training: Old-age insurance can aﬀect incentives for education and life-time train-
ing. Training investments become more attractive if they yield a larger present value of income
gains and pay oﬀ over a longer working period. For this reason, postponing retirement age tends
to encourage training. Lau and Poutvaara (2006), for example, analyze the impact of aging and
the pension system on training. In particular, they emphasize that an increase in retirement age
and a strong link between pensions and contributions encourage investment in education.4
3See Börsch-Supan (2000), Mitchell and Phillips (2000), Crémer and Pestieau (2003), Bütler et al. (2004) and
Gruber and Wise (2004), among others. Fisher and Keuschnigg (2009) emphasize how the retirement decision
interacts with labor supply incentives earlier in the life-cycle.
4De la Croix and Licandro (1999), Boucekkine et al. (2002), Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) and Soares (2005) ﬁnd
these eﬀects in theoretical models, too. See Jaag (2009) for an analysis of aging on education decisions.
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4.1 The Computational Model
Model Structure: We use a calibrated general equilibrium model of a small open economy to
study the quantitative impact of aging on the ﬁnancing of social security and the public sector
in Switzerland. For a suﬃciently close approximation of the demographic structure (see Figures
2-3 for illustration), the individual life-cycle is decomposed into eight age states, resulting in
eight diﬀerent age-groups with constant transition rates from each state to the next. Individuals
become economically active at the age of 20. The ﬁrst group reﬂects the size and characteristics
of the cohort of 20-29 year old individuals, the last group corresponds to the cohort of 90 to
99 years old (see Table 2 below). The ﬁrst ﬁve age-groups are active while the last three are
retired. The average retirement age reﬂects the retirement decision of people in group 5, the
60-69 year olds. This generalized overlapping generations model features a period length of one
calender year and allows for realistic short- and long-run dynamics. Limiting number of diﬀerent
age-states greatly reduces the numerical complexity.5
The model captures demographic change and diﬀerent dimensions of labor market behavior.
Savings and investment result from intertemporal choice with perfect foresight. Households
save to ensure smooth consumption in the face of uneven life-cycle income patterns. A larger
pension replacement rate reduces private savings since agents do not need to save themselves
when the pension system provides income. In contrast, a longer remaining lifetime and early
retirement boost savings since individuals must accumulate more capital to be able to maintain
their living standard over a prolonged retirement period. Higher net interest rates encourage
savings. Smoothing consumption depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution with
estimates ﬂuctuating around .5. Capital accumulation results from intertemporal investment
decisions of domestically owned ﬁrms. In the long-run, the elasticity of investment with respect
to the user cost of capital varies around unity which is consistent with a substitution elasticity
between capital and labor equal to around .8, see Altig and Carlstrom (1999) and Altig et al.
(2001), among others. Adjustment costs imply that capital accumulation is a smooth process
even in an open economy with a ﬁxed interest rate.
5See Grafenhofer et al. (2007). The present version is documented in Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2008).
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Firms must then create a larger number of vacant jobs to attain a given desired employment
level. The overall job surplus to be earned by workers and ﬁrms together is the diﬀerence
between the marginal product of labor and the workers’ reservation wages. The wage follows
from bargaining and splits the total job surplus between workers and ﬁrms. A high bargaining
power of workers results in a high wage and, thereby, a high job rent of workers which boosts
incentives for job search. A high wage, in contrast, reduces the job rent of ﬁrms and their
incentives to create jobs. As a consequence, labor market tightness (i.e. the ratio of vacancies
to job searchers) is low and unemployment is high since many workers will compete for few jobs.
The higher is the bargaining power of workers, the higher is the equilibrium wage and the larger
is the unemployment rate. Depending on the bargaining power of workers, high labor taxes as
well as high unemployment beneﬁts are partly shifted to ﬁrms so that both inﬂate the wage and
lead to more unemployment. The estimate of Scarpetta (1996) implies that a 10% increase in
the replacement ratio of unemployment beneﬁts leads to an unemployment rate higher by about
1.3 percentage points. This coeﬃcient compares with an estimate of 1.7 in Layard et al. (1991),
1.1 in Nickel (1997) and roughly the same in Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).6
Parameters: Table 1 shows key data and parameters of the simulation model. The numbers
depict the growth trend of the Swiss economy with 2005 as reference year. The values of the
key behavioral elasticities reﬂect the consensus of recent econometric research. We refer to Altig
and Carlstrom (1999) and Altig et al. (2001) for standard parameter values not discussed here.
The average unemployment rate is 3.6% in the initial steady state (ISS). It varies during the
life-cycle, being larger for younger workers (see Table 2). The labor market participation rate
is 74% on average. The average retirement age is about 64 in Switzerland which is relatively
high in comparison with other countries. Approximately 40% of workers 60-70 years-old are
still active in the labor market. Table 2 shows the age structure of the population: the 60-70
years-old represent roughly 13% of the total population. The old age dependency ratio (deﬁned
here as the ratio of workers to retirees) is 28% in the initial steady state (ISS).
6Readers may consult the project report and technical appendix for more detailed discussion of the model,
parameter values and institutional features, see Jaag et al. (2008).
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Households and Production:
r 0.035 annual real interest rate
g 0.018 growth rate of labor productivity
δ 0.100 depreciation rate of capital
σK 0.800 elasticity of capital labor substitution
σC 0.350 intertemporal elasticity of substitution
  u 0.036 average unemployment rate
  δ 0.740 average participation rate
x 0.400 retirement age/participation rate 60-69 years old*)
NR/NW 0.277 retiree-worker ratio
Welfare System:
ρu 0.540 replacement rate of unemployment beneﬁts
ρa 0.230 replacement rate of social assistance
τL
1 0.328 eﬀective tax rate, hours worked
τP
1 0.373 eﬀective tax rate, prime age participation
τS
1 0.693 eﬀective tax rate, job search
τR 0.236 eﬀective tax rate, continued work
Legend: *) The retirement date corresponds to the share of active house-
holds in the group of 60-70 years old.
The eﬀective tax rates in the last four rows of Table 1 summarize the joint incentive eﬀect
of all taxes and relevant replacement incomes on diﬀerent behavioral margins of labor supply.
Except for the retirement decision, Table 1 shows these tax rates for the ﬁrst age group, which
corresponds to the 20-30 years old. The eﬀective tax rate on intensive labor supply (hours worked
by the employed) mirrors the wage tax burden that is 26% on average. In addition, the eﬀective
tax rate is inﬂated by the tax component of PAYG pension contributions and the consumption
tax. Like wage taxes, consumption taxes also lower real wages. The resulting eﬀective tax
rate is about 33% for the youngest workers. The participation tax rate for prime age workers
includes the employee tax burden plus the replacement income due to social assistance and
other subsidies (as a share of an employees’ gross income). According to Table 1, the eﬀective
participation tax rate at 37% is rather low and not much higher than the eﬀective wage tax
17burden, while the eﬀective tax rate on job search is almost twice as big. There are two reasons
for this pattern. First, unemployment beneﬁts are much more generous than social assistance.
When moving from unemployment into a job, workers thus face much higher opportunity costs
in terms of foregone beneﬁts, compared to giving up social assistance and other beneﬁts when
moving out of non-participation. Second, only a quarter of the non-participating are covered by
social assistance so that, on average across all households, social beneﬁts are less important for
the participation decision.
Finally, the participation tax rate on the retirement decision equal to 24% seems to be rather
low by international standards. The Swiss PAYG pillar includes pension supplements for each
year of postponed (discounts per year of premature) retirement equal to 6.8% which seems close
to an actuarially fair value. The supplements and discounts in the funded pillar are actuarially
fair by deﬁnition. Therefore, the tax distortion against postponed retirement basically consists
of the general wage tax burden only. This low participation tax rate may be interpreted as an
important aspect of the high ﬂexibility of the Swiss labor market which diﬀers from unfavorable
labor market incentives in the pension systems of many other countries.
Table 2 reports life-cycle parameters where the upper half refers to demographic parameters
that were already discussed in the context of Figures 1 and 2. One of the most novel and
policy relevant features of the computational model is that it captures the life-cycle incidence
of earnings, skills and unemployment. We can thus contrast the unemployment experience
of younger workers early in their career with the labor market status of older workers near
retirement. The life-cycle income proﬁle depicts the usual hump-shaped pattern where the
incomes of retired groups mostly reﬂect net of tax pensions. Disposable income of active groups
depends on their skills which endogenously adjust to training incentives and induce life-cycle
wage proﬁles, and on a directly progressive wage tax which is highest for people with earnings
at the peak of their career. As is typical for life-cycle models without bequests, the marginal
propensity to consume out of life-time wealth increases with age so that the oldest persons have
the highest consumption propensity because they expect the shortest remaining life-time.
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Age Group a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Cohort 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-99
Population share Na/N 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.01
Age retention rate ωa 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.95 0.97 1.00
Survival rate γa 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.90
Marg.prop.consume 1/∆a 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12
Disp.wage income   ya 0.63 0.89 1.02 1.01 0.69 0.62 0.58 0.56
Wage tax rate tw,a 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Labor productivity   θ
a 1.43 1.95 2.23 2.26 1.85 - - -
Participation rate δa 0.65 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.65 - - -
Unemployment rate ua 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 - - -
Legend: 1 − ωa is the transition rate to the next age state. 1 − γa is the mortality rate in
each age state.
Pension System: The model captures the institutional characteristics of the Swiss pension
system with three pillars: the PAYG system, the mandatory private pension system, and volun-
tary private savings with preferential tax treatment as a third pillar. PAYG spending represents
6.6% of GDP, of which about 3/4 are covered by contributions. The gross replacement rate in
the PAYG pillar is 40%. Only 60% of PAYG pensions are earnings-linked. The ﬂat component
reﬂects the fact that the tax-beneﬁt-link is eliminated for minimum pensions of low income
households and maximum pensions of people with earnings higher than the upper contribution
ceiling. The division into a ﬂat and a variable part is important for the size of the tax component
of contributions: the larger the share of the ﬂat part in the PAYG pension is, the higher is the
contribution tax. The size of the tax component depends also on notional interest, equal to the
growth rate of wages. The total eﬀective average employee and employer contribution is about
8.3%, yielding an implicit tax rate of about 2% in the youngest age group.
Adding funded and mandatory PAYG pensions yields a gross replacement rate of about 60%
of the last wage income in total. Of total pension income, 65% stems from the PAYG and 35%
from the funded pillar. Funded pensions not only reﬂect accumulated contributions but also
earned interest. The tax component of private pillar contributions is clearly lower. However, it
19is still positive because of administrative costs. In our model, we assume that administrative
costs consume 1% of the return on pension assets. Hence, pension funds generate an eﬀective
return of 2.5% which is lower than the market interest rate of 3.5%. Total pension assets amount
to approximately 127% of GDP.
4.2 Long-Run Eﬀects of Aging
With our calibrated model at hand, we now quantify the long-run economic eﬀects of aging as
described in Section 2.1. The demographic scenario consists of three elements: (i) the depen-
dency ratio roughly doubles due to increased longevity; (ii) the total population increases by
10% in the long-run; and (iii) the working age population declines by about 6%. For a given
inﬂow of new generations, increased longevity would actually expand the total population by
substantially more than 10%. Hence, the inﬂow of new agents is scaled down to an extent that
limits the population increase to the projected 10%. This smaller inﬂow therefore reduces the
working age population. To provide a benchmark, it is assumed that the government follows
a passive strategy, leaving current beneﬁt rules unchanged and merely adjusting wage taxes
and contribution rates to balance budgets. The long-run eﬀects are reported in column ‘Age’
of Table 3. In section 2.2, we have argued that contribution rates and wage tax rates must
strongly increase, and that the pure demographic eﬀect implies a large decline in per capita
income. The equilibrium results must be much larger for two reasons. First, the actual increase
in the dependency ratio is larger than in the example of Section 2.2. Second, the required large
increases in tax and contribution rates strongly discourage labor supply, leading to a further
reduction in per capita income beyond the pure demographic eﬀect.
Table 3 shows a large long-run impact of aging on public ﬁnances and the economy. Fiscal
balance requires to add 7.4 percentage points to the wage tax schedule over the entire income
range. For example, the wage tax rate of the 20-30 years old would increase from 24 to 31%, and
similarly for all other groups. On top of that, contribution rates of both employees and employers
must also be raised by 7.4 percentage points. Alltogether, the statutory labor tax burden rises by
22 percentage points. While employer contributions are a full factor tax, employee contributions
only partly count as a tax. The eﬀective tax on hours worked rises by almost 10 percentage
points, and similarly the eﬀective participation tax. Aggregate labor supply thus shrinks due
20to fewer hours worked and lower participation of prime age workers. The eﬀective tax rate
on job search rises to a lesser extent since unemployment beneﬁts are partly indexed to net
wages so that a higher wage tax burden not only reduces the value of work but also the value
of unemployment. Nevertheless, the tax distortion still increases substantially, from an already
high level, which leads to a large increase in the unemployment rate, from 3.6% in the absence
of aging, to 6.4%. This large eﬀect is also due to higher employer contributions which inﬂate
wage costs of ﬁrms and discourage job creation.
Aging induces a moderate tendency for early retirement which reﬂects oﬀsetting forces. On
the one hand, increased longevity leads to a large reduction in capital funded pensions which,
other things equal, implies postponed retirement. On the other hand, the tax changes favor
early retirement. Although higher wage taxes reduce both active earnings and pensions, higher
contribution rates exclusively diminish income from continued participation and, thus, makes
work relatively less attractive compared to retirement. This second eﬀect dominates and induces
early retirement which eventually reduces the participation rate among the 60-70 years old from
.4 to .33. The scenario implies diverse training incentives for diﬀerent life-cycle groups which
overall result in moderately higher average labor productivity. With this exception, all labor
market responses work to magnify substantially the demographically induced reduction of the
workforce. Aggregate employment thus falls by 12.8% in absolute levels. Since aging has no
consequences for long-run capital intensity in a small economy with a ﬁxed interest rate, the
GDP level shrinks by the same percentage. However, GDP is now divided over a 10% larger
population so that per capita GDP declines by 21%. With this benchmark in mind, we now
turn to the potential of several policy strategies to cushion the economic impact of aging.
4.3 A Comprehensive Policy Approach
Basically, there are three possibilities to oﬀset the eﬀects of aging on the ﬁnancing of social
security: reduced beneﬁts, higher contributions, and an increase in the retirement age. From
an individual’s perspective, the common denominator of all these measures is a reduction of
the beneﬁt-contribution ratio. These adjustments refer not only to the PAYG, but also to the
funded pillar. When pension funds must pay beneﬁts over a longer remaining life, actuarial
principles require either a lower replacement rate or larger reserves for annuities which must
21be saved with higher contributions during active working life. Other ways to oﬀset the labor
market impact of aging are structural reforms that improve incentives and strengthen the wage
base. Section 2.2 argued that an increase in retirement age must be a central policy response
to avoid a large increase in tax rates or a decline in replacement rates. In the following, we
present and quantitatively evaluate a comprehensive reform package which consists of seven
elements: (i) raising the retirement age to increase the participation rate among older workers;
(ii) strengthening the tax beneﬁt link in the PAYG pillar by eliminating the upper income ceiling
for pension assessment so that beneﬁts become earnings linked also for incomes higher than this
ceiling; (iii) eliminating unemployment beneﬁts from the contribution base so that periods of
unemployment no longer add to entitlements of PAYG pensions; (iv) taking measures to reduce
administrative costs in the funded pillar which are rather high by international standards, by half
a percentage point; (v) tighter monitoring of unemployed persons to cut the unemployment rate
and strengthen the contribution base; (vi) measures to encourage life-long training to strengthen
the contribution base but also to improve the employability of older workers to facilitate the
increase in the retirement age. In all cases, the VAT is raised by 4 percentage points, and the
wage tax schedule and PAYG contribution rates by both workers and ﬁrms are endogenously
adjusted to assure ﬁscal budget balance at all dates. The VAT is considerably less harmful to
incentives for extensive labor supply than wage taxes because it taxes the income in both active
and inactive states while the wage tax reduces only the employed income. The higher VAT
allows for smaller increases in wage taxes and contribution rates so that the ﬁnancing of social
security becomes less damaging for labor market performance. The last six columns in Table 3
present the cumulative impact of these policy measures so that the last column shows the total
eﬀects of aging and structural policy reform relative to the Status Quo growth equilibrium in
the absence of aging and reform.
4.3.1 Raising Retirement Age
Raising the retirement age to keep older workers in the labor force is the central piece of the
reform package. Raising the statutory retirement age by 3 years means that the regular pension
will be received only at the age of 68 instead 65, with no additional pension compensation and
an unchanged replacement rate. Pension supplements/discounts are kept at 6.8% per year so
22that postponing retirement beyond 68 is rewarded and retirement earlier than 68 is discour-
aged. Column ‘Late’ in Table 3 reports long-run eﬀects. Comparing to column ‘Age’ shows the
diﬀerential impact of the reform while comparing to ‘ISS’ gives the total impact of aging and
the higher retirement age. Recall that the (exogenous) long-run expected retiree-worker ratio
as a result of aging is close to 0.5, almost twice as much as today’s ratio of 0.27. Raising the
retirement age reduces the number of pensioners and augments the active workforce, leading to
a much smaller increase in the dependency ratio to 0.38. Still, the number of retirees is 40%
higher than in the status quo. Hence, not only the VAT rate is up by 4%, but also the wage tax
and contribution rates to the PAYG pillar have to rise by 2.4% to ﬁnance the large increase in
pension spending due to longer life-spans.
The direct eﬀect of raising retirement age is that the decline in the physical labor force by
7.2% is turned into a gain of 1.7% relative to the ISS (initial steady state). However, eﬀective
tax rates are higher for all margins of labor supply, although much less than in the pure aging
scenario. Eﬀective tax rates on hours worked and on participation of prime age workers are up by
almost 5 percentage points, and somewhat less with respect to job search. Relative to the aging
scenario, incentives for job search improve considerably and reduce the unemployment rate from
6.4 to 4.5%. The lower tax load also encourages participation of prime age workers. Importantly,
training investments become more proﬁtable since the returns to training accrue over a longer
working life. Average labor productivity signiﬁcantly improves by 1.3%, up from .7% in the
aging scenario. To sum up, raising the retirement age provides a strong ﬁscal relieve, allows
for a lower tax burden and strengthens incentives on all margins of labor supply. The measure
thus oﬀsets a large part of the negative economic incentives created by aging. Consequently,
the decline in total labor demand is reduced to -.8%, a huge improvement relative to the loss
of -13% in the aging scenario. While the level of GDP is down by a moderate -.8%, GDP per
capita still declines by around -10% on account of a larger population due to longevity. The
loss in per capita GDP as a result of aging is almost halved. Finally, a higher retirement age
strongly reduces life-cycle savings and wealth per capita since individuals need to save for a
shorter remaining retirement period.
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ISS Age Late Ceil Un Adm Mon Train
Absolute Changes:
Tax Increase i) 0.000 0.074 0.024 0.020 0.017 0.010 0.009 0.006
Implicit Payg Tax ii) 0.019 0.083 0.032 0.018 0.015 0.011 0.010 0.007
Eﬀ. Tax on Hours ii) 0.328 0.411 0.371 0.358 0.358 0.350 0.352 0.348
Eﬀ. Particip.Tax ii) 0.373 0.461 0.416 0.403 0.402 0.394 0.395 0.391
Eﬀ. Tax on Search ii) 0.693 0.738 0.715 0.709 0.687 0.683 0.683 0.681
Eﬀ. Retirement Tax 0.236 0.202 0.202 0.053 0.052 0.026 0.027 0.024
Pension Repl.Ratio 0.600 0.568 0.606 0.589 0.579 0.583 0.584 0.580
Retirement Date 0.400 0.334 0.801 0.811 0.811 0.814 0.813 0.815
Participation Rate 0.740 0.721 0.725 0.728 0.728 0.730 0.730 0.730
Unemployment Rate 0.036 0.064 0.045 0.042 0.034 0.032 0.026 0.025
Percentage Changes:
Labor Force -7.232 1.748 1.933 1.946 1.998 1.990 2.026
Gross Wage -4.541 -1.610 -1.489 -1.871 -1.406 -2.057 -1.851
Hours Worked -1.363 -0.836 -0.652 -0.623 -0.483 -0.500 -0.501
Labor Productivity 0.668 1.270 1.285 1.298 1.306 1.285 2.602
Labor Demand -12.835 -0.797 0.285 1.173 1.907 2.354 3.946
GDP p.cap. -20.913 -9.990 -9.009 -8.202 -7.537 -7.131 -5.686
Consumption p.cap. -20.896 -11.003 -10.027 -9.665 -7.838 -8.079 -6.688
Wealth p.cap. 9.067 -5.996 -5.009 -4.630 -5.742 -6.296 -7.494
Legend: Columns report cumulative eﬀects. i) Financing through higher wage tax and PAYG
contributions. In the reform scenarios, 4 percentage points of VAT are also added. ii) Tax rate
for 20-30 years-old; (Age): Aging without reform (no use of VAT ﬁnancing); (Late): increase in
retirement age; (Ceil): eliminate contribution ceiling in PAYG pillar; (Un): no accumulation of
pension entitlements of unemployed; (Adm): reduction of administrative costs in funded pillar;
(Mon): monitoring of the unemployed; (Train): investment in training.
4.3.2 Strengthening the Tax-Beneﬁt-Link
In Switzerland, the PAYG pillar limits beneﬁts to a maximum amount so that contributions
above an upper income threshold (equal to 79’560 Fr. per year) do no longer augment individ-
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this threshold are no longer linked to individual earnings. In this upper income range, contri-
butions are perceived as a full tax which adds to the general income tax and discourages labor
market behavior. Currently, out of all pension payments from the PAYG pillar, 2% refer to
minimum pensions, 60% to regular earnings linked pensions, and 38% on maximum pensions
above the income ceiling. In the simulation model, 40% of pensions in the status quo are ﬂat
and 60% are earnings linked. The scenario speciﬁcally assumes that the share of earnings linked
PAYG pensions is raised to 90% and the ﬂat pension reduced to 10%, rather than to 2%. This
conservative assumption should allow for somewhat higher minimum pensions to cushion other
negative distributional eﬀects such as the reduction of the real pension value due to a higher
VAT rate. Finally, to avoid an increase in pension levels when a larger part of income enters the
beneﬁt assessment, the scenario also assumes a moderate reduction of the replacement rate.
Column ‘Ceil’ reports the total long-run eﬀects where the diﬀerential eﬀect of eliminating
the income ceiling is seen by comparing to column ‘Late’. The economic implication is to reduce
the tax component in PAYG contributions and to reap eﬃciency gains by strengthening the
tax-beneﬁt-link. The required increase in wage tax and contribution rates is reduced from 2.4 to
2%. Eﬀective tax rates fall on all margins, and rather strongly in case of the eﬀective retirement
tax on account of a somewhat lower replacement rate. The reform stimulates labor supply on
all margins (relative to column ‘Late’). As a result, total employment as measured by labor
demand expands by one percentage point, turning a loss of -.8% to a gain of .3%. GDP per
capita now falls by 9%. Hence, strengthening the tax-beneﬁt-link by eliminating the income
ceiling yields an income gain of almost one percentage point.
4.3.3 Eliminating Unemployment Beneﬁts from Contribution Base
The PAYG pillar in Switzerland adds unemployment beneﬁts like any other earned income to
the pension assessment base. The problem with this rule is that it alleviates the consequences of
unemployment and weakens job search incentives. Presumably, this rule is intended to prevent
old-age poverty. This goal, however, is already addressed by the existence of minimum pensions
which are raised as part of the preceding policy initiative. By eliminating this rule, pensions
are linked exclusively to employment. Denying new pension entitlements during unemployment
25strengthens search incentives and must favorably aﬀect the unemployment rate and thereby
total employment. As column ‘Un’ in Table 3 shows, the eﬀective tax rate on search is reduced
by 2 percentage points, leading to a signiﬁcant reduction in the unemployment rate from 4.2
to 3.4%. Lower unemployment saves spending on unemployment beneﬁts and allows a small
reduction in residual wage tax and contribution rates, down from 2 to 1.7%. The gross wage
falls more strongly since the reform cuts the workers’ fallback option in wage bargaining. With
higher job rents, ﬁrms expand labor demand by placing more vacancies, making possible the
substantial reduction in the unemployment rate. The slight cut in the wage tax rate has positive
side eﬀects on the other margins of labor supply. Therefore, eﬀective employment and the level
of GDP now increase by 1.2%, where the diﬀerential eﬀect amounts to almost 1 percentage
point. Accordingly, the loss in GDP per capita is reduced from 9 to 8.2%.
4.3.4 Reducing Administrative Costs of Funded Pillar
The fragmentation and complexity of the funded pillar in Switzerland with a multitude of
independent pension funds and relatively low returns have been criticized in the past, among
others by the World Bank (Queisser and Vittas, 2000). Better supervision, more competition and
more freedom of choice might yield a higher return. We cannot quantify the precise magnitude
of the eﬃciency gain and instead assume, somewhat arbitrarily, that the administrative cost can
be reduced from 1% to .5% of pension fund assets. Column ‘Adm’ reports the long-run eﬀects.
Due to lower administration costs, the return in the second pillar rises from 2.5 to 3% while the
net interest in the capital market remains at 3.5%. The contribution rate to the funded pillar
is kept constant but contribution capital earns a larger interest and, ceteris paribus, results in
a larger funded pension. To keep the total pension replacement rate ﬁxed, the PAYG pension
is scaled down by the same factor as the private pension is scaled up. The budgetary saving
is used to cut wage tax rates as well as employee and employer contributions to the PAYG
system. In general equilibrium, these rates can be reduced in total by roughly 2 percentage
points (100×3×(.017 − .01), see the ﬁrst line in Table 3). Eﬀective tax rates are thus reduced
to a moderate extent which stimulates all margins of labor supply. The unemployment rate drops
further to 3.2%. Alltogether, eﬀective employment and per capita GDP expand by another .7%,
as compared to the prior scenario.
264.3.5 Tighter Monitoring of Unemployed
Sanctions against shirking in job search and monitoring of unemployed job seekers are often used
instruments of active labor market policy. To model monitoring and santions, we assume that
unemployment also yields some leisure utility. We assume that monitoring and sanctions in case
of observed inactivity in job search can reduce the value of being unemployed by a monetary
equivalent of 5% of unemployment beneﬁts. We also ignore additional administrative costs due
to monitoring and assume that these activities are covered out of the existing budget for labor
market policy. Column ‘Mon’ shows the quantitative, long-run impact. The direct eﬀect is
to reduce the worker’s fallback option and, thus, the reservation wage. The intervention thus
increases the total job rent which amounts to the diﬀerence between the marginal product of
labor and the reservation wage. Wage bargaining splits the larger surplus between workers and
ﬁrms so that the wage rate must fall (by 2% instead of 1.4%) which, in turn, boosts the job rent
of both ﬁrms and workers. As a result, workers search more intensively, and ﬁrms ﬁnd it more
proﬁtable to create jobs. The unemployment rate, in turn, shrinks from 3.2 to 2.6% and ends up
being 1 percentage point lower than in the ISS. The repercussions on the wage tax burden and
on other dimensions of labor supply are basically insigniﬁcant. Overall, eﬀective employment
and GDP expand by half a percentage point and grow by 2.4% relative to ISS. The loss in GDP
per capita is further reduced to 7.1%.
4.3.6 Incentives for Life-Time Training
In an aging society, life-time training may be an important means to compensate, at least partly,
for the decline in labor supply resulting from a reduced inﬂow of young workers. Households
reallocate time from work to training and spend on books and other equipment to improve on
their skills or simply to keep up with changing work requirements. In the model, real spending on
training is government controlled but privately paid for. The scenario assumes that government
mandates an increase in training expenditures by one percent. Households then endogenously
respond by augmenting training time. Both the time opportunity cost and the larger spending
on training equipment is accounted for. As a result of more active training, average labor
productivity rises by an additional 1.3% and ends up 2.6% higher than in the ISS. The higher
quality of the workforce boosts eﬀective employment by an extra 1.6%. All in all, the levels of
27eﬀective employment and GDP are 3.9% higher than in the status quo. The loss in per capita
income is limited to 5.7%, down from 7.1%. The repercussions on other components of aggregate
labor supply are not important. One may conclude from the results of Table 3 that training is
an important policy area to cushion the economic impact of aging.
4.4 Life-Cycle Eﬀects
Aging and structural social security reform may have an uneven impact on the life-cycle. Figure
4 reveals that strengthening training incentives may disproportionately beneﬁt older workers in
the long-run. The eﬀects of training accumulate if workers respond to improved incentives over
the entire working life. Postponed retirement also sharpens training incentives since it allows
workers to consume the returns over a longer working life. The strongest eﬀect is probably
with the oldest workers near retirement. The skills of older workers are also of special interest
since they aﬀect their employability. In an aging society, it is important to keep older workers
longer in the labor force. Many observers are concerned, however, that an increase in the
retirement age could be ineﬀective because older workers may be diﬃcult to employ. However,
the simulations show a more optimistic picture. Postoned retirement boosts training incentives












Figure 4: Life-Cycle Training
28The life-cycle pattern in Figure 5 points to the diﬀerent unemployment incidence for young
and old workers. Unemployment among younger workers falls quite sharply, by 1.5 percentage
points for the 20-30 years-old. The main reason is the elimination of unemployment beneﬁts
from the contribution base as well as stronger monitoring as part of active labor market policy.
A stronger tax-beneﬁt link also encourages job search and reduces unemployment. However, the
employability of older workers near retirement is negatively aﬀected even though the eﬀect is
rather negligible. Delaying actual retirement by about four years amounts to a strong increase of
labor supply. The unemployment rate thus rises in this group but remains very low in absolute
terms, especially by international comparison. The present framework does not lend support to
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Figure 5: Life-Cycle Unemployment Rates
4.5 Transitional Adjustment
Table 3 shows the long-run equilibrium to which the economy eventually converges. However,
short- and medium-run eﬀects are of special interest to policy makers. Additional assumptions
about the temporal implementation of the policy measures are necessary. We refrain here from
any elaborate transition strategies. The policy shocks in Table 3 are instantaneously and per-
manently implemented as a total reform package. Public debt and real public spending are kept
29constant in per capita terms. The response to the demographic and policy shocks can easily lead
to non-monotonic adjustment since demographic change with overlapping generations proceeds
at a slow pace while economic adjustment occurs at a much faster speed. Figure 6 shows that
the old-age dependency ratio may take 6 to 10 decades to fully adjust. The horizontal axis mea-
sures the time (in years) after the reform. Economic variables such as tax rates and employment
in Figure 7 are also determined in the demographically induced equilibrium and need similarly













Figure 6: Demographic and Economic Dependency Ratio
The economic dependency ratio is the ratio of retired to active persons and is rather more
important for ﬁscal balance and economic performance than the demographic dependency ratio
which is the ratio of older than 65 over younger people. As Figure 6 illustrates, the relatively large
increase in retirement age adds additional workers and shrinks the number of retired persons and,
thereby, squeezes the economic dependency ratio by about 12 percentage points. Since the policy
shock is instantaneously implemented, the retirement age rises fast and leads to a rather sudden
increase in the participation rate of the 60-70 years old. As a result, the economic dependency
ratio declines substantially in the short-run (to 20 instead of 27%) which creates large ﬁscal
savings and allows considerable cuts in tax and contribution rates in the short-run, see Figure 7.
This reduction also mirrors the instantaneous rise in the consumption tax rate of 4 percentage
points. Consumption taxes are rather less damaging for the labor market because not only wage
income, but also replacement incomes are taxed. With substantially lower taxes, labor market
performance is quite strong in the early phase of demographic change. Eﬀective employment
30rises much stronger than in long-run equilibrium. As demographic change proceeds, the ratio
of tax payers to beneﬁt receivers worsens so that taxes and contributions must be continuously
increased to assure budget balance. After ﬁve decades, taxes and contributions reach a higher
level than in the initial situation. Eﬀective employment, in turn, falls back again and yields
a much more moderate long-run gain. GDP per capita rises in the short-run, too, before the
negative impact of aging sets in. In principle, it would be possible to use the ﬁscal surpluses in
the early phase not to cut tax rates but to reduce government debt in order to save debt service
and keep the tax burden lower in the future. Such intergenerational redistribution would reduce
the short-run income gains but also cut the long-run income losses per capita. Alternatively,
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Figure 7: Wage Tax, PAYG Contributions and Employment
5 Conclusions
A longer life-time in good health is one of the great gifts of medical advancement. At the same
time, increased longevity induces a large demographic change which creates huge challenges
for ﬁnancing social security and could substantially reduce per capita income in the future.
According to oﬃcial demographic projections, the old-age dependency ratio will approximately
double and the population is expected to grow by 10% until 2050. One may safely expect that a
shock of this scale will have important repercussions on economic performance. In this study, we
have used a rich computational model of life-cycle labor supply, unemployment and retirement
31to quantify the potential impact of aging on economic performance in Switzerland. When beneﬁt
rules are kept constant and the government follows a passive policy of raising wage taxes and
social security contributions to achieve ﬁscal balance, the consequences might be rather bleak.
Taking account of economic adjustment, simulations show that the labor tax burden might need
to rise by 20 percentage points and per capita income could fall by roughly the same amount,
compared to the status quo without aging and reform.
Such a scenario is neither politically realistic nor reasonable but may be used as a reference
point. We have found that a comprehensive policy approach can largely alleviate the unfavorable
consequences of aging on per capita income. The ﬁnancing of social security with largely the
same replacement rates as today might require only a moderately higher tax burden. By far the
most important measure is an increase in retirement age by about 4 years so that longer lived
future generations roughly split their extended total life-time between work and retirement in
the same way as present generations must do. The comprehensive policy approach investigated
in this paper includes further structural reform of the pension system and other measures to
stimulate training and labor market performance. All in all, the simulation results show that
this reform package could limit the increase of the tax burden to 4 percentage points of value
added tax and keep the loss in per capita income to a moderate 6%. To put this number into
perspective, a period of zero growth over 3-4 years relative to continued trend growth would
yield the same decline in per capita income.
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